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I assume the editorship of this journal in the sign of continuity with the 
previous management. In recent years Relations has been an important 
point of reference for those who want to address the issues of animal 
and environmental ethics from a non-anthropocentric perspective. We 
will continue along this path, exploring alternative points of view to the 
approach that has dominated Western thinking for millennia.
Historically the problem of who possesses moral status, i.e. of the 
entities that have moral importance as such  1, has been effectively visual-
ized with the metaphor of the expanding circle  2. In fact, history con-
fronts us with a process of progressive enlargement of the sphere of indi-
viduals considered moral patients. Initially the boundaries of the moral 
community are so narrow as to include only the human beings of one’s 
own family or social group (if we put in parentheses religious obliga-
tions towards the divinity or deities, but they also have a particularistic 
nature). Everything outside of this sphere, of whatever kind, human or 
not, is below the threshold of moral consideration. Then slowly the circle 
extends until it comprises an entire people. But it does not go further. 
It is sufficient to think of the evaluation of an institution like slavery. 
For instance, in the Bible the strict prohibition against slavery applied to 
members of their own lineage is attenuated and disappears if it concerns 
individuals from different populations (see Leviticus, 25, 39-47). On the 
other hand also in Classical (Greek-Roman) thought, women, slaves, bar-
 1 In other terms, all beings toward whom moral agents have direct duties.
 2 This metaphor dates back to Lecky 1869, 103. But it was later successfully taken 
up by Peter Singer, who entitled in this way one of his books (see Singer 1981). 
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barians are not clearly inserted in the moral community, they are located 
in a border area; and, if they are given any moral status, it is much lower 
than that of free males. The universalistic perspective is still far away in 
Plato and Aristotle, which seem to limit the domain of moral patients to 
the Greek world (Warren 2000, 14). Only a few philosophers argued that 
human beings as such are worthy of respect. 
But even when common morality and philosophical reflections come 
to include all humans in the moral community, they are far from conceiv-
ing them in equal terms, namely from giving them equal dignity. Race 
and sex discrimination persist until the late twentieth century and are 
found in the legal codes of many countries (just think, to give just one 
example, the right to vote, denied to women for a long time). And in 
some areas of our planet they remain even in the twenty-first century. 
The great turn in a non-anthropocentric direction starts from the 
sixties and seventies of the twentieth century when even a position that 
englobes the human community in an equal way, without discrimi-
nation of race and sex, begins to appear limiting and, in analogy with 
racism and sexism, is accused of specism, because it unduly bases the 
boundaries of the moral community on a mere biological fact like species 
belonging. On these bases, alternatives emerge that further extend the 
domain of moral patients and with which ethical-philosophical reflection 
is still confronted today. Schematically I group them into four options: 
(1)  rationalism (or personalism), (2) sentiocentrism, (3) biocentrism, 
(4) ecocentrism.
The option of rationalism asserts that moral community is composed 
only by rational beings or persons. The discriminating element is no 
longer belonging to a species, as it cannot be belonging to a race or to 
a sex (otherwise we fall into racism or sexism), but possession of certain 
morally relevant inter-racial, interspecific, inter-sexual characteristics: 
the presence of states of consciousness, mnemonic abilities, a sense of the 
future, beliefs and intentionality; in a word those properties that make 
something a person, namely a self-conscious and rational entity. 
But these characteristics, in addition to humans, do not only belong to 
possible extraterrestrial intelligences. If conceived in non-maximal terms, 
they are also possessed by non-human terrestrial animals, such as great 
apes, dolphins, whales, etc., and more generally mammals (but accord-
ing to some even birds and fish), whose mental complexity is emerged 
(and emerges) in an increasingly convincing manner from evolutionary 
considerations and experimental data (behavioral and neurophysiologi-
cal). Therefore, identifying in the concept of person the discrimination 
for inclusion in the moral community has as a result the inclusion of the 
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members of such animal species among moral patients. From this point 
of view, they too deserve the respect that is due to beings that are worth 
in themselves and not in function of something else.
On the other hand, if the concept of person in some ways is more 
extensive than the concept of a human being, from other points of view it 
could be more restrictive. In fact, if we adopt a functionalistic conception 
of person, limiting the moral community only to persons would seem to 
exclude human infants, who certainly are not able to exercise self-con-
sciousness and rationality. But even by adopting a broader conception 
of person, atypical humans (humans with severe mental handicaps, due 
to genetic abnormalities, developmental defects, accidents, illnesses, etc.) 
are at risk of being left out of the range of moral patients. They do not 
even seem to possess the potential to exercise rational capacities. Leaving 
out non-paradigmatic humans, however, seems a rather counterintuitive 
result. And so, to avoid it, we are forced to further extend the bounda-
ries of the moral community, enlarging them to include also those beings 
who possess the characteristics of atypical humans, that is to say, beings 
that are sentient, even if they are not rational or not fully rational. But at 
this point, for coherence, one is obliged to include non-human sentient 
beings, i.e. all sentient beings tout court, in the moral community, out-
lining the option we have called sentiocentrism. In this perspective the 
dividing line is marked not so much by self-awareness and rationality, 
but by sensitivity, i.e. the ability to have sensations and in particular those 
of pleasure and suffering, properties in possession of large sectors of 
the animal world. Where there are psychological states there is an entity 
worthy of direct moral consideration.
But for someone the moral community must overcome even the 
limits of sensitivity and to come to include all living beings, according to 
a point of view that sometimes is called biocentrism, in other cases vital-
ism, more rarely conativism. In the biocentric perspective, the status of 
moral patient is extended to every living organism, animal or vegetal, sen-
tient or non-sentient, as a teleological center of life, with a good in itself. 
The telos of the organism is to reach a state of maturity and reproduce 
itself. Human action can prevent the achievement of this end.
Finally, there is an even wider conception of the moral commu-
nity than biocentrism: ecocentrism. The defenders of the ecocentric 
approach challenge the individualistic or atomistic character of the bio-
centric conception. For the supporters of this line not only the individual 
entities are deserving of moral protection, but so are the totalities: spe-
cies, ecosystems, food and biotic chains, and, in addition to them, the 
inanimate entities.
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But the question of moral status is not limited to the topic of the exten-
sion of the moral community. It also includes the problem of its internal 
structure. Because once we have identified the range of moral patients, we 
must ask ourselves whether they are all to be placed on the same level, or 
whether the moral community is stratified on several levels. If the second 
alternative is true, a criterion of inclusion in the moral community is not 
enough to fully answer questions about the moral status of the entities; a 
criterion of comparison is also necessary to identify the levels of belong-
ing. So – to use spatial metaphors – the problem of who possesses moral 
status is not yet fully defined when we have identified who is inside the 
moral community and who is outside it. There is also the problem of 
who is above and who is below. It remains, in other words, to establish 
whether those who are inside are included on an equal basis or not.
And therefore we will have, for instance, egalitarian and non-
egalitarian forms of sentiocentrism or biocentrism. A clear example of 
egalitarian sentiocentrism can be found in the pages of Joan Dunayer. 
According to Dunayer, all sentient beings are within the moral com-
munity and on equal terms, there are no hierarchies. They all have the 
same moral status, regardless of their biological species or cognitive 
skills, because there are no convincing arguments to assert that the life 
of a more mentally complex being has more value than the life of a less 
complex being (Dunayer 2004). On the other hand in non-egalitarian 
versions, in addition to sensitivity, other components come into play, that 
pose the moral community on several levels. In this case, sensitivity is the 
condition for access to the moral community, whose internal structure, 
however, is determined by further factors. For instance, there are those 
who, while identifying sensitivity as the gateway to enter the moral 
community, believe that on a comparative level the greater cognitive, 
emotional and social complexity of a being gives it a greater moral 
status. This means that the parameters do not necessarily have to be 
taken separately. It may be that the parameter “reason” does not count 
for entry, but applies to assign more weight, i.e. in terms of comparison 
between moral patients. The attribution of a relevant weight to mental 
complexity on the comparative level can lead to believe that in case 
of conflict (the life of) a mentally more complex sentient being takes 
precedence over (the life of) a mentally less complex sentient being.
Even considering an entity, just because it is living, worthy of moral 
consideration does not necessarily mean putting all living beings on an 
equal footing with regard to moral status. The most articulated example 
of egalitarian biocentrism can be found in the texts of Paul Taylor, 
a Kantian deontologist who extends the value in itself and the idea of 
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respect to all living beings, who, in his opinion, possess the same inher-
ent value (understood as the value in itself of things that are not states 
of consciousness, for which the expression “intrinsic value” is preferred; 
see Taylor 1986). Different ideas on how to structure the moral commu-
nity of all living people can be found in the ethical vitalism (or conativ-
ism) of philosophers such as Goodpaster and Attfield. Attfield argues 
that all living beings have interests; even non-sentient ones like plants 
and bacteria. But the interests of the latter have (significantly) less moral 
weight than those of sentient beings (Attfield 1991, 154). In a conception 
of non-egalitarian biocentrism, therefore, even if mere life has inherent 
or intrinsic value, if a being, in addition to life, possesses sensitivity, this 
gives it a higher value. And indeed, the greater is its capacity to “feel”, 
the greater is its value. Moreover, if, in addition to sensitivity, a being also 
possesses qualities such as memory, sense of the future, rationality, self-
awareness etc., its value grows further. A growth that has an additional 
increase the more these complex mental skills are developed.
These are, in brief, the perspectives that we have before us and on 
which we will focus our attention. In conclusion, let me make some thanks.
I am grateful to LED publisher, in the person of Valeria Passerini, 
for the trust placed in me and I hope to repay it with a constant com-
mitment to keep the journal at the high standards expressed so far. A 
heartfelt thanks to all those who have renewed their adhesion to the 
project of Relations and to the new collaborators, who have accepted my 
invitation to participate in this exciting adventure. In the end, a special 
thanks to Matteo Andreozzi, who created this review and passed me the 
baton.
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